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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Technological Disruption and the Platform Economy
Technology's disruptions are not limited to the marketplace.' Just as
innovation can quickly render long-standing industries obsolete,2 it can
1. For a recent overview of technology's impacts both inside and outside of the
marketplace, see DAVID E. NYE, TECHNOLOGY MATTERS: QUESTIONS TO LIVE WITH (2007);
see also Arthur Cockfield & Jason Pridmore, A Synthetic Theory ofLaw and Technology, 8
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 475 (2007) (analyzing competing views on technology's social,
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likewise render long-standing legal frameworks irrelevant.3 Indeed, 21st
century innovations have already upset many common law doctrines
painstakingly developed throughout the 20th century.4 Moreover, pressing
legal issues ranging from copyright to employment law have proven
underserved by the available tools at judicial disposal, and judges have
unsuccessfully applied outmoded theories to plainly feral problems.5 Rather
than force these innovations into outdated 20th century schema, however,
some scholars and judges have recognized the need for innovative
jurisprudential solutions.6
The traditional employee/independent contractor distinction-strained
by recent technological advances-is one such issue, having garnered
cultural, political, and legal impacts). For an extreme account of technology's impacts known
as "technological determinism"-the belief that technology itself shapes social, cultural, and
political views, see generally MERRITT ROE SMITH & LEO MARX, DOES TECHNOLOGY DRIVE
HISTORY?: THE DILEMMA OF TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM (1994).
2. For background on the process of "creative destruction," see generally J. STANLEY
METCALFE, EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION (2002); JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1942).
3. See also Kevin Maney, The Law Can't Keep Up With Technology ... And That's a
Very Good Thing, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 31, 2015, 2:27 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/.2015/11
/13/government-gets-slower-tech-gets-faster-389073.html; Vivek Wadhwa, Law and Ethics
Can't Keep Pace with Technology, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.technology
review.com/s/526401,/laws-and-ethics-cant-keep-pace-with-technology; see generally Mirit
Eyal-Cohen, Through the Lens ofInnovation, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 951, 951 (2016) (arguing
inter alia that "[t]he legal system constantly follows the footsteps of innovation"); David
Friedman, Does Technology Require New Law?, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (2001)
(discussing legal responses to technology and identifying at least three ways in which
technology affects the law); Neal Katyal, Disruptive Technologies and the Law, 102 GEO. L.J.
1685, 1689 (2014) (addressing some examples of technology's legal disruptions and
identifying the law's fimction as "[p]roviding human values in an age where technology causes
both profound wonderment and profound disruption").
4. See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ("The test the
California courts have developed over the 20th Century [sic] for classifying workers isn't very
helpful in addressing this 21st Century [sic] problem."); O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F.
Supp. 3d 1133, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ("The application of the traditional test of
employment a test which evolved under an economic model very different from the new
'sharing economy'-to Uber's business model creates significant challenges. Arguably, many
of the factors in that test appear outmoded in this context."). Some recent examples include
wearable cameras' disruption of individual privacy law, 3D printing's disruption of intellectual
property law, and driverless cars' disruption of tort liability. See passim Katyal, supra note 3.
5. See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997) (describing the
application of established trademark law in the fast-developing world of the internet as "like
trying to board a moving bus"); Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081 (describing the application of
established worker status law to the ride-sharing world as being "handed a square peg and
asked to choose between two round holes").
6. For the "square peg" imagery, see Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081. For scholarly
attempts to refine jurisprudence, see infra Part II.
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numerous proposals for 21st century renovations.7 Indeed, the growth of the
so-called platform economy,8 an economic sector in which digital platforms
like Uber enable or facilitate workers' generation of income, has deeply
problematized this traditional distinction.9 Two recently decided cases have
popularized these problems, having received even general news coverage."o
In Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., a California court struggled with determining Lyft
drivers' worker status and lamented the state's "outmoded" worker status
tests." Similarly, in O'Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., the court
struggled with applying a traditional employment test "which [had] evolved
under an economic model very different from the new 'sharing economy.""12
The difficulty these and other courts have faced in such cases arises from the
novel employment relationships presented by the platform economy. 13
As detailed in Part II of this Note, workers in the platform economy bear
unique and highly individualized relationships with the platforms they use. 14
For example, unlike traditional workers, many platform workers control the
number of hours they work, the distribution of those hours throughout the
week, the geographic area in which they work, and the immediate
environment in which they work.' 5 Yet, at the same time, many platform
economy workers depend exclusively upon a single platform for their
livelihoods.16 These facts alone problematize the application of the
7. See infra Section II.B.
8. Though I use the term "platform economy," this sector has many names: the "gig
economy," the "peer economy," the "collaborative economy," the "sharing economy," the
"access economy," the "on-demand economy," the "TaskRabbit economy," etc. See Gerald F.
Davis, What Might Replace the Modern Corporation? Uberization and the Web Page
Enterprise, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 501, 512 (2016) (identifying various names and ultimately
suggesting the term "platform capitalism"); Meaghan Murphy, Cities as the Original Sharing
Platform: Regulation of the New "Sharing" Economy, 12 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 127, 129 (2016)
(identifying some common names of the gig economy).
9. Examples of "platform economy" companies include: Uber, Lyft, Turo,
HopSkipDrive, AirBnB, OneFineStay, OpenAirplane, ToolLocker, ParkingPanda, Closet
Collective, Postmates, AmazonFlex, TaskRabbit, Dolly, HelloTech, SpareHire, Freelancer,
Etsy, Feastly, and Udemy.
10. See Elizabeth Weise, Lyfit Settles with California Drivers for $27A USA TODAY
(May 11, 2016, 7:59 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2016/05/ 11 yft-agrees-27-mil
lion-settlement/84257158/.
11. Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1082.
12. O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
13. See infra Section II.A.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Section II.B.
16. See Jonathan V. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for
Uber's Driver-Partners in the United States 10 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 22843, 2016) (finding that 38% of Uber partners solely work for Uber).
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traditional employee/independent contractor worker status distinction.'7
Additionally problematic, however, is the individuality of each worker's
relationship with the platform." For example, while some platform workers
maintain non-platform employment and only supplement their incomes with
platform-facilitated work, others mine their entire livelihood from the
platform.19 Traditional employees, on the other hand, have historically
maintained employment with a single employer-and only in rare
circumstances maintained dual employment with competitors.
In recent years, courts nationwide have struggled over the application of
worker status distinctions to platform employment relationships.20 Their
belabored attempts have prompted an abundance of scholarship on the
subject, and this scholarship in turn has occasionally directed subsequent
courts' analyses.21 Importantly, scholars have approached the platform
economy's employment dilemma in varying ways.22 Some have called for
the creation of a third worker classification, while others support a default
assumption in favor of either employee or independent contractor.23 Still
others simply suggest a recalibration of the traditional distinction.24
B. Strippers, Uber Drivers, and Worker Status in South Carolina
One of the largest shortcomings of scholarship on the platform
economy's legal disruptions is its exclusively nationwide focus. 25 Indeed, I
have found no assessment to date probing the readiness or amenability of an
individual jurisdiction for the current disruptions. Thus, most scholarship
overlooks the "legal baggage" carried by individual jurisdictions facing
platform economy issues.26
Though no South Carolina court has yet wrestled with a platform
employment case, they have addressed highly analogous issues involving
workers using a somewhat different platform. Indeed, as this Note shows in
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See, e.g., Search v. Uber Techs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222 (D.D.C. 2015); McGillis
v. Dep't of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
21. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Petitioner at 9, BeavEx, Inc. v. Costello, 810 F.3d 1045
(2016) (No. 15-1305), 2017 WL 2438363, at *9.
22. See infra Section II.B.
23. See infra Section II.B.
24. See infra Section II.B.
25. See infra Section II.B.
26. See infra note 69.
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Part IV, South Carolina courts' employment analyses of exotic dancers
provide helpful parallels to platform workers.27
Importantly, both groups of workers maintain highly unique,
independent, and individualized employment relationships with the owners
of their respective platforms.28 Both groups of workers utilize a shared
platform to conduct their work and retain control over the amount of hours
they work, the distribution of those hours throughout the week, the
geographic area in which they work, and the immediate environment in
which they work. 29 Moreover, both groups may routinely alternate between
competitor platforms.30 A Friday Uber driver can become a Saturday Lyft
driver; a Friday dancer at one club may become a Saturday dancer at
another.3' Additionally, both groups' employment status can fluctuate
dramatically within a relatively short period workers in either group might
work throughout June, cease work for July unilaterally and without notice,
and then unilaterally opt to resume work throughout August. What's more,
workers in both groups receive no set wages from their employer; they
obtain income based solely on their quantity and quality of work.
Based on these factual correspondences, courts have unsurprisingly
faced similar issues in addressing the employment status of either group of
workers.3 2 Importantly, this shared irreverancy enables us to anticipate
South Carolina courts' analyses of platform employment. Their past
assessments of exotic dancers can help reveal their future assessments of
platform workers.33 Troublingly, however, South Carolina courts' recent
assessments of exotic dancers' employment status run counter to the most
promising models of platform economy employment.3 4
This Note responds to most nationwide scholarship on the subject by
examining the jurisprudential readiness of a single jurisdiction-South
Carolina-for platform employment. It ultimately argues that in order to
27. See infra Part IV; see also Michael H. LeRoy, Bare Minimum: Stripping Pay for
Independent Contractors in the Share Economy, 23 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 249 (2017)
(noting some similarities between exotic dancers and Uber drivers).
28. Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1511, 1539-46 (2016).
29. See id.
30. See generally How to Drive for Uber and Lyfit Simultaneously, RIDE SHARE
CONSULTING (July 5, 2017), https://www.rideshareconsulting.com/uncategorized/how-to-drive
-for-uder-and-lyft-simulteneously/.
3 1. See id.
32. See infra Parts III, IV.
33. See infra Part III.
34. See infra Section IV.A.
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maintain the state's cultivated "business friendly" environment,3 5 South
Carolina courts should heed recent scholarship's advice on the platform
economy and proactively reorient their worker status jurisprudence.
After surveying the problems of platform employment and recent
scholarly solutions to them, this Note examines South Carolina's readiness
for such issues in a novel way. Drawing from its courts' analyses of exotic
dancer employment, this Note explores a South Carolina court's likely
handling of an Uber case with facts similar to O'Connor v. Uber,
Technologies, Inc. Based on this analysis, this Note argues that a South
Carolina court would problematically deem all Uber drivers, and likely
many other platform workers, employees of the platform. Because this
generalizing decision would contradict the most promising scholarly models
of platform employment, this Note further argues that South Carolina should
reorient its worker status jurisprudence.
II. WORKER STATUS IN THE PLATFORM ECONOMY
The employment classification of platform workers is a thorny and
unsettled issue.3 6 As the platform economy has grown nationwide, judges
and scholars have repeatedly attempted to solve its disruptions to worker
status jurisprudence.37 As noted above, many platform workers control the
number of hours they work, the distribution of those hours throughout the
week, the geographic area in which they work, and the immediate
environment in which they work.38 Yet, many platform economy workers
depend exclusively upon a single platform for their livelihoods.3 9
Increasingly, more judges across the country have attempted to resolve
specific platform employment issues using their inherited jurisprudence.40
Additionally, academic articles abound on the subject, with many offering
unique-and contradictory solutions.41 While some advocate only
recalibration of our current worker status distinctions, others call for radical
revisions or the creation of entirely new worker categories. Still others
35. See, for example, the South Carolina Department of Commerce's slogan "Just right
for your business." S.C. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, https://www.sccommerce.com/ (last visited
Feb. 23, 2018).
36. See infra Section II.B.
37. See infra Sections II.A-B.
38. See Means & Seiner, supra note 28.
39. See Hall & Krueger, supra note 16, at 10 (finding that 38% of Uber partners solely
work for Uber).
40. See, e.g., Search v. Uber Techs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 222 (D.D.C. 2015); McGillis
v. Dep't of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
41. See infra Section lI.B.
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simply call for a recalibration of the traditional distinction.42 This Part
surveys both judicial and academic responses to the problem of platform
worker status. It then analyzes in detail the most promising approach taken
thus far the Means-Seiner "worker flexibility" approach.43
A. Judicial Approaches to Worker Status in the Platform Economy
Unlike many academic approaches to platform economy employment,
judicial approaches have primarily been conservative.44 Restrained by the
established employment tests in their respective jurisdictions, judges have
simply applied the standard tests with relatively little adornment.45 Though
some judges have noted the insufficiencies of standard tests, they have found
little guidance on how to update them.46 And, as will be shown below, many
scholarly proposals are too drastic to offer much assistance to trial court
judges confined to prior rulings.47 Thus, most judicial approaches have been
strained applications of plainly inapplicable tests.48
B. Scholarly Approaches to Worker Status in the Platform Economy
As indicated above, numerous scholars have proposed solutions to
platform economy employment.49 Though a full review of academic
42. See infra Section II.B.
43. See infra Section II.B.
44. See infra notes 45-48.
45. See, e.g., Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., No. 15-CV-05128-JSC, 2017 WL 2951608, at
*5-6 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (applying the Borello factors); O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F.
Supp. 3d 1133, 1138-39 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (applying California's "right to control" test); Cotter
v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (applying the Borello factors but
noting their insufficiency).
46. See, e.g., Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (applying the Borello
factors but noting their insufficiency); O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1138-39 (applying
California's "right to control" test).
47. See infra Section II.B.
48. See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997) (describing the
application of established trademark law in the fast-developing world of the internet as "like
trying to board a moving bus"); Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081 (describing the application of
established worker status law to the ride-sharing world as being "handed a square peg and
asked to choose between two round holes").
49. For an overview of some "third category" approaches, see Miriam A. Cherry &
Antonio Aloisi, "Dependent Contractors" in the Gig Economy: A Comparative Approach, 66
AM. U. L. REV. 635 (2017); Yasaman Moazami, Uber in the U.S. and Canada: Is the Gig-
Economy Exploiting or Exploring Labor and Employment Laws by Going Beyond the
Dichotomous Workers' Classification?, 24 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 609 (2017);
2018] 951
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approaches to worker status in the platform economy is outside the scope of
this Note, many important observations may be made.5o Generally speaking,
recent proposals fall into three categories: (1) "modification approaches,"
seeking to recalibrate traditional worker status tests; (2) "third category
approaches," recognizing a separate category of "dependent contractors" and
creating a tripartite worker status schema; and (3) "assumption-shifting
approaches," proposing a default assumption of platform workers as
employees.5' To be sure, each category offers conceptually appealing
revisions of the worker status doctrine. Both the "third category" and the
"assumption shifting" approaches, however, share a critical shortcoming:
impracticability.52 Both require either direct legislative intervention in the
worker status doctrine or radical judicial alteration of it. Courts may
implement the modification approaches, on the other hand, directly into their
current analyses without great upset.53
Though all more practicable than the "third category" and "assumption
shifting" approaches, not all modification approaches bear the same degree
of practicability or even desirability. For example, some recent
proposals-such as that of Cunningham-Parmeter-add greatly to the
judicial burden in platform cases while offering comparatively little clarity
or insight.54 Such proposals seem to only add to the confusion surrounding
Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Shared Economy, 43 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 31 (2016) (advocating a "dependent contractor" status).
50. See infra Section 1I.B; see also Mark J. Loewenstein, Agency Law and the New
Economy, 72 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1034-44 (2017).
51. See infra Section II.B.
52. See Means & Seiner, supra note 28, at 1516 (noting that a "significant advantage"
of their modification approach is that it does not require implementation of new legislation).
53. Id.
54. Cunningham-Parmeter offers a modified approach to traditional worker status
distinctions. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment
in the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REv. 1673 (2016). His modified "control" test asks courts
to expand their traditionally narrow concept of control to explicitly incorporate "the subjects of
control," "the directions of control," and "the obligations of control." Id. at 1674. By
addressing these three aspects of control, Cunningham-Parmeter suggests that courts can
identify employers who "meaningfully influence working conditions," and overturn the "layers
of contractual relationships" that frequently "obscure that power." Id. Though helpful for
establishing "the outer limits of employer-employee relationships" as an academic exercise,
Cunningham-Parmeter's proposed test proves too sweeping and cumbersome for any court to
adopt -especially those in South Carolina. Rather than narrow a court's focus, Cunningham-
Parmeter's test substantially broadens it. For example, the proposed "subject of control"
inquiry alone-only one of three-asks courts to not only examine "direct supervision" but
also "a company's overall ability to shape the contours of performance-related expectations."
Id. at 1678. As an illustration, Cunningham-Parmeter provides the following example:
[I]f a large firm controls every aspect of its relationship with a subcontractor or
an independent contractor (such as the manner in which a product is produced, the
952 [VOL. 69: 945
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platform employment by increasing the number and scope of factors for
judicial consideration. Ultimately, even if such approaches offered reliable
and proper employment status decisions, their burden of application would
still outweigh their benefits.
Other modification approaches-like that proposed by Brown are too
general and sweeping to provide nuanced determinations.5 6 In fact, though
labor costs for producing the product, and the timeline for delivering the product),
then this direct control over labor-based outcomes provides the firm with effective
control over working conditions as well.
Id. at 1678. When courts finish this gargantuan inquiry, Cunningham-Parmeter's approach
then asks them to examine the test's second prong "the direction that control travels between
firms and workers"-and its third "the obligations that larger, end-user firms have to prevent
unlawful employment practices." Id. What's more, Cunningham-Parmeter admits that his
modified control test "does not mean that courts should focus exclusively on the concept of
control at the expense of other employment-related factors." Id. at 1679.
Accordingly, Cunningham-Parmeter's approach not only fails to narrow courts' focus,
but it only invites further factual overload. Courts already struggle with endless considerations
for distinguishing employees and independent contractors. They do not need a new list of
considerations. Thus, in his attempt to solve worker status in the platform economy,
Cunningham-Parmeter has articulated an unrealistically burdensome and labyrinthine
approach.
55. See, e.g., Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., No. 15-CV-05128-JSC, 2017 WL 2951608, at
*5-6 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (applying the Borello factors); O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F.
Supp. 3d 1133, 1138-39 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (applying California's "right to control" test); Cotter
v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (applying the Borello factors but
noting their insufficiency).
56. Brown advocates a modified version of the traditional employment test for platform
employment. See Grant E. Brown, An Uberdilemma: Employees and Independent Contractors
in the Sharing Economy, 75 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 15 (2016). Brown's test simply asks
courts to focus their analysis of platform employment on two questions within the traditional
"economic realities" test: (1) whether a worker can improve his economic opportunity through
managerial skills, and (2) whether the worker's services are integral to the employer's
business. Id. at 16. The first question-sometimes called the "entrepreneurial opportunities
test"-is designed to effectively categorize employees who nonetheless retain a high degree of
control. Id. at 25. Following the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Brown offers the
classically problematic example of a full-time cook who retains a high degree of control over
his work. Id. at 36. Though in control to some degree, the cook nonetheless remains an
employee of his employer. Id. This example illustrates the limits of control's usefulness as a
focal point. Like the cook, many employees retaining control over their work may still not
have any opportunity to apply their own managerial skills to improve their economic
opportunity. In Brown's view, courts should not consider such workers truly independent.
When applied to Uber drivers, this "entrepreneurial opportunities" factor preponderates for an
employment relationship in every case. As Brown notes, for example, "Uber drivers cannot
improve their economic position through managerial skill" because their only method of
increasing economic opportunity is driving more hours. Id. at 37. Thus, for Brown, all Uber
drivers fail the "entrepreneurial opportunities test" and are accordingly Uber's employees.
Consequently, unlike the "worker flexibility" approach of Means and Seiner, Brown's test
permits no granularity. Thereunder, a Wal-Mart cashier driving for Uber five hours per month
2018] 953
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framed as objective "tests," Brown's and some other approaches are heavily
weighted toward an employee determination.57 Thus, they ring too activistic
to be of much assistance to judges-especially in conservative jurisdictions
like South Carolina.
The most promising modification approach for South Carolina is the
Means-Seiner "worker flexibility" approach. This approach suggests that
courts evaluate "worker flexibility" to determine a given platform economy
worker's status.58 Means and Seiner base their proposal on a "crucial, often
dispositive" question: "How much flexibility does the individual have in the
working relationship?"59 In practice, as they note, this question frequently
turns on scheduling.60 For example:
The more flexible a worker's schedule is-and the more control a
worker has over her daily routine-the more likely that individual is
an independent contractor. By contrast, if an employer dictates the
in his spare time is just as much an Uber employee as someone driving forty hours per week
and solely dependent on Uber for income. Brown's second factor the integrality of Uber
drivers to Uber poses additional problems for the classification of Uber drivers. Indeed, it
begs the central question of Uber cases: is Uber a technology company facilitating independent
drivers or a driving company offering employees more independence? In either case, Uber
drivers are integral to the company's success-but only in the latter are they employees. In
answering this question, Brown dismissively states that "Uber is undoubtedly in the
transportation business." Id. at 39. He bases his conclusion on three observations: (1) Uber's
business is specific; (2) Uber has previously advertised itself as a technology company; and (3)
Uber is deeply involved in marketing and managing drivers and prices. Id. All three sidestep a
complicated analysis and ultimately offer little insight into Uber's nature.
Firstly, the specificity of Uber's business is irrelevant; TurboTax does not employ
independent accountants simply because its business is based in part on their use of the
program. Moreover, Uber's advertisements offer limited insight into the company's true nature
because they are frequently contradictory. For example, though it has previously called itself
an "on-demand car service," Uber's legal page informs readers that "Uber is a technology
company that has developed an app that connects users (riders) with third party transportation
providers." See Uber Guidelines for Third Party Data Requests and Service of Legal
Documents, UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/data-requests/guidelines-for-third-party-data-
requests/en/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2018). Thus, Brown's conclusion that Uber is a
"transportation company" is premature and ought not serve as the basis for drivers' worker
status. The nature of Uber is less clear than Brown intimates, and whether employees or
not -Uber drivers are integral to its business. Thus, Brown's second factor is ultimately
unhelpful for determining the worker status of Uber drivers. Like Cunningham-Parmeter's
approach, Brown's proposed two-factor test appears less helpful for South Carolina than
Means and Seiner's "worker flexibility" evaluation.
57. See, e.g., id.
58. Means & Seiner, supra note 28.
59. Id. at 1535.
60. Id.
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worker's schedule, the inflexibility of the worker's schedule would
indicate an employment relationship.61
Thus, unlike the approach of Brown and the others mentioned above, the
worker flexibility approach allows specificity and avoids overgeneralization.
Under it, two workers for the same platform may have a different
employment status:
For example, someone signed up as a driver on the Uber or Lyft
platforms may have other full-time employment and drive only
occasional hours when the opportunity arises. To the extent Uber
and Lyft accommodate drivers' schedules, the flexibility of the
relationship should weigh heavily in favor of a finding that the
drivers are independent contractors. Indeed, many if not most Uber
and Lyft drivers may fall in this category. By contrast, FedEx
drivers who work regular schedules seem to fall within the
employment category, regardless of whether FedEx attempts to
structure an independent contractor relationship.62
By focusing courts' examinations on worker flexibility, the Means-
Seiner approach allows specificity, nuance, and avoids erroneous
classifications based on generalized categories of workers.63
Moreover, the Means-Seiner approach is noteworthy outside of its
substantive appeal. Importantly, as Means and Seiner note, any court
examining the "economic reality" of a working relationship is probably
already obligated to consider worker flexibility because it "clarifies the
economic independence of working relationships."64 Thus, no legislative or
jurisprudential reform is necessary whatsoever for adoption of this
approach.65 Rather, Means and Seiner simply rearticulate and reinvigorate
the traditional test. Thus, based on feasibility alone, this approach seems the
most promising for South Carolina's conservative jurisprudence.
To be sure, the worker flexibility test still requires cumbersome,
factually-intensive judicial analysis of each case. Thus, it fails to alleviate an
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1541-42.
63. Interestingly, as detailed below in Part III.A, the South Carolina Supreme Court has
stated its disapproval of reliance on sweeping categorical determinations in Lewis v. L.B.
Dynasty, Inc. (Lewis 2015), 411 S.C. 637, 770 S.E.2d 393 (2015).
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often-lamented characteristic of worker status determinations.66 However,
the "worker flexibility" approach also appears the most promising based on
its simplicity, concreteness, and predictability. Its adoption would at least
narrow judicial focus to a subset of facts. Thus, while imperfect, the worker
flexibility approach seems the best yet offered for South Carolina.
A desirable model of platform employment is simple, concrete,
consistent, and flexible. Thus far, only Means and Seiner's "worker
flexibility" model meets-or at least approaches-all four criteria.
Moreover, it requires no activist legislative or jurisprudential reform.
Because "worker flexibility" is the most desirable-and ultimately the most
feasible model of platform economy employment, South Carolina should
look to it when modifying its own jurisprudence.
III. ExoTIc DANCERS' WORKER STATUS IN SOUTH CAROLINA
South Carolina courts' determinations of exotic dancers' worker status
offer insight into their likely platform employment determinations. In
making their exotic dancer determinations, South Carolina courts have
applied statutory-specific tests ultimately traceable to the common law.67 In
South Carolina, worker status determinations generally turn on a putative
employer's right to control the worker.68 In fact, this focus on the right to
control has roots deep in English legal history.69 Accordingly, today the
66. See, e.g., Sec'y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting
that economy "'reality' encompasses millions of facts, and unless we have a legal rule with
which to sift the material from the immaterial, we might as well examine the facts through a
kaleidoscope").
67. See generally infra note 69 for a discussion of the historical development of worker
status.
68. Debbie Whittle Durban, Independent Contractor or Employee?, 21 S.C. LAW. 31,
34(2010).
69. The modern legal distinction between "employees" and "independent contractors"
has deep roots in American jurisprudence. In fact, the conceptual basis for this distinction
extends back to pre-Conquest England. Thus, to fully understand the complexities of modern
platform economy employment, we must understand at least some of the "historical baggage"
of the employee/independent contractor distinction. See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still
Can't Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 309 (2001). The common law's approach to the employer/employee
relationship derives from its earlier approach to the master/servant relationship. See, e.g.,
passim Evelyn Atkinson, Out of the Household: Master-Servant Relations and Employer
Liability Law, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 205, 207 (2013); see also Allen v. Columbia Fin.
Mgmt., Ltd., 297 S.C. 481, 488, 377 S.E.2d 352, 356 (Ct. App. 1988); Bowen v. U.S. Capital
Corp., 295 S.C. 201, 204, 367 S.E.2d 474, 476 (Ct. App. 1988) ("In determining whether
someone is an independent contractor or a servant, the proper test is whether the alleged
master has the right and authority to control and direct the manner or means of accomplishing
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right to control examination underlies virtually all jurisdictions' analyses
nationwide. However, in determining a putative employer's degree of
control over a worker, courts implement a variety of tests based on the
nature of the action at hand.70 Some of the most common-and here the
most relevant types of actions in South Carolina are state court claims
brought for workers' compensation and federal court claims brought under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 71
South Carolina courts apply a four-factor test to employment status in
workers' compensation claims, analyzing (1) direct evidence of the putative
employer's right or exercise of control; (2) its furnishing of equipment; (3)
its method of payment; and (4) its right to fire.72 However, South Carolina's
federal courts-following Fourth Circuit precedent apply a six-factor test
the work."); Republic Textile Equip. Co. of S.C. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 293 S.C. 381, 387, 360
S.E.2d 540, 543 (Ct. App. 1987) (discussing a "master-servant relationship"); Todd's Ice
Cream, Inc. v. S.C. Emp't Sec. Comm'n, 281 S.C. 254, 258, 315 S.E.2d 373, 375-76 (Ct. App.
1984) ("In determining whether an individual is a servant (employee) or an independent
contractor, the proper test to be applied is not the actual control exercised by the alleged
master, but whether there exists the right and authority to control and direct the particular work
or undertaking, as to the manner or means of its accomplishment."). Indeed, as the South
Carolina Court of Appeals explicitly recognized, "the words 'employer' and 'employee' are
outgrowths of the older terms 'master' and 'servant."' Allen, 297 S.C. at 488, 377 S.E.2d at
356. Though the employee/independent contractor distinction's conceptual underpinnings
recede back to pre-Conquest England, the distinction itself can be traced to Early Modern
England. See Atkinson, supra note 69, at 206. The "household government" system, wherein
the master of a household exercised "domestic rule" over his dependents such as wives,
children, servants and slaves, was prominent throughout Early Modern England. In fact, this
system governed most pre-industrial work relationships. Id. at 208. Importantly, the
hierarchical relationships between these dependents and the head-of-household involved
reciprocal rights and responsibilities, namely the duty of dependents to obey their master in
exchange for his protection. Id. For example, in return for masters' control over their lives,
servants were legally entitled to necessities like food, clothing, lodging, and medical care. In
fact, these "servants" primarily, but not always, lived intra moenia "within the walls" of the
master's house. Id. This system predominated throughout the Early Modern period, and the
British colonists transplanted this system to America with little alteration. Id The modern
employee ultimately has his or her roots in this system, and in fact never completely "shook
free of the household." See Atkinson, supra note 69, at 207.
70. See supra note 69.
71. See Durban, supra note 68, at 33-34.
72. See, e.g., Shatto v. McLeod Reg'l Med. Ctr., 406 S.C. 470, 475-76, 753 S.E.2d 416,
419 (2013). It seems that Tharpe v. G.E. Moore Co., 254 S.C. 196, 199, 174 S.E.2d 397, 399
(1970), first established the four-factor test in South Carolina. From 2000 to 2009, South
Carolina courts held the view that "any single factor is not merely indicative of, but, in
practice, virtually proof of, the employment relation." See Dawkins v. Jordan, 341 S.C. 434,
439-40, 534 S.E.2d 700, 703-04 (2000). However, in 2009, the South Carolina Supreme Court
re-clarified that the four factors operated "with equal force in both directions." Wilkinson ex
rel. Wilkinson v. Palmetto State Transp. Co., 382 S.C. 295, 300, 676 S.E.2d 700, 702 (2009).
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to claims brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, analyzing (1) the
putative employer's degree of control over the manner in which the work is
performed; (2) the worker's opportunities for profit or loss dependent on
managerial skill; (3) the worker's investment in equipment, material, or
other workers; (4) the degree of skill required for the work; (5) the
permanence of the working relationship; and (6) the integrality of the
worker's services to the putative employer's business. 3 Though differing in
articulation, the four-factor and six-factor tests are frequently
indistinguishable in practice and commonly return the same results.74
However, as will be seen, certain differences could become important in the
context of platform economy employment.75
South Carolina courts have thoroughly examined the worker status of
exotic dancers at least three times,76 and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
has done so at least once.7 7 These cases involved exotic dancers' claims
under South Carolina's Workers' Compensation Law and the Fair Labor
Standards Act. And in each case the courts deemed the exotic dancers
employees of the clubs at which they performed.7 1
A. Lewis v. L.B. Dynasty, 411 S.C. 637, 770 S.E.2d 393 (2015).
South Carolina courts' most recent analysis of exotic dancers' worker
status comes from Lewis v. L.B. Dynasty, in which the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that an exotic dancer was an employee under the state
73. Schultz v. Capital Int'l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 304-05 (4th Cir. 2006). The
Supreme Court of the United States first articulated this test in United States v. Silk, 331 U.S.
704 (1947).
74. See Durban, supra note 68, at 34.
75. See infra Part IV.
76. See Sodekson v. East Coast Rest. & Nightclubs, LLC, No. 4:15-CV-02711-RBH,
2016 WL 4613386 (D.S.C. Sept. 6, 2016) (resulting in a consent judgment through which
defendant voluntarily alleged unpaid wages under the FLSA); Gardner v. Country Club, Inc.,
No. 4:13-cv-03399-BHH, 2015 WL 7783556, at *17 (D.S.C. Dec. 3, 2015) (finding exotic
dancers were employees under the FLSA); Degidio v. Crazy Horse Saloon and Rest., Inc., No.
4:13-cv-02136-BHH, 2015 WL 5834280, at *14 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2015) (finding exotic
dancers were employees under the FLSA); Dittus v. KEG, Inc., Nos. 3:14-cv-00300-JFA,
0:14-cv-03029-JFA, 2014 WL 6749183 (D.S.C. Dec. 1, 2014) (resulting in out-of-court
settlement and prompting no decision on employment status); Lewis v. L.B. Dynasty, Inc.
(Lewis 2015), 411 S.C. 637, 646, 770 S.E.2d 393, 398 (2015) (finding an exotic dancer was an
employee under the Workers' Compensation Act); Lee v. Regal, Inc., No. 2008-UP-071, 2008
WL 9832882, at *2 (Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2008) (simply noting that an exotic dancer was
"employed by" a club).
77. See McFeeley v. Jackson St. Entm't, LLC, 825 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding
dancers were employees under the FLSA).
78. See infra Sections III.A-D.
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Workers' Compensation Law.79 The plaintiff in Lewis, an exotic dancer, was
struck in the abdomen by an errant bullet at a Columbia, South Carolina club
called the Studio 54 Boom Boom Room (Boom Boom Room).so
Lewis, the plaintiff, was a nineteen-year-old exotic dancer based in
Charlotte." She primarily performed at a single club in Charlotte, but spent
two to three nights per week working at other clubs throughout the
Carolinas.8 2 She earned roughly $300 in cash per night. 83 One of the South
Carolina clubs at which she worked was the Boom Boom Room, an
establishment at which she had performed twice before the night of the
incident.8 4
Lewis had no written agreements with the Boom Boom Room and on
each night had spontaneously arrived there "uninvited and unannounced."5
Upon arrival at the club, she presented identification proving her age,
underwent a search, reviewed and signed the club's "rules sheet," and paid
the required tip-out fee.86 She then changed her outfit in the club's dressing
rooms and found her place on the schedule of stage dances which the club
devised once the dancers arrived. 87
Under the arrangement, Lewis would receive a fine if she failed to
perform a stage dance at her slated time.8 " In addition to stage dances,
however, Lewis also performed table dances and V.I.P. dances.8 9 In fact, the
club required her to perform V.I.P. dances in its private rooms for any patron
who requested one.90 It also set a minimum price for these dances, and it
required a cut of their proceeds.91 Presumably, Lewis performed table and
V.I.P. dances when she was not performing stage dances. Importantly, if
Lewis violated any provision of the rules sheet she signed upon entry
including prohibitions against fighting, below-waist nudity, and sexual
activity in the club-she could be fined or "fired." 92
79. See Lewis 2015, 411 S.C. at 646, 770 S.E.2d at 398.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 639, 770 S.E.2d at 394.
82. See Lewis v. L.B. Dynasty, Inc. (Lewis 2012), 400 S.C. 129, 131, 732 S.E.2d 662,




86. Id. at 132, 732 S.E.2d at 663.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Lewis v. L.B. Dynasty, Inc. (Lewis 2015), 411 S.C. 637, 640, 770 S.E.2d 393, 394
(2015).
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On her third night performing at the Boom Boom Room, a fight broke
out and Lewis was struck in the abdomen by a stray bullet.93 The bullet
severely damaged her intestines, liver, pancreas, kidney, and uterus.94 After
the incident, Lewis filed a workers' compensation claim "requesting
temporary total disability benefits and medical treatment from the date of the
accident."95 However, the South Carolina Uninsured Employer's Fund
disputed the claim on her putative employer's behalf. 96 It argued she was an
independent contractor rather than an employee of the Boom Boom Room. 97
The Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) deemed her an
independent contractor and denied compensation.98
Lewis appealed this decision, but the Commission's appellate panel
affirmed it.99 She then appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals,
which in turn affirmed the appellate panel's decision.100 However, the South
Carolina Supreme Court ultimately reversed this decision, finding that "the
details of her professional relationship preponderate[d] in favor of finding
she was an employee."o
In making its determination, the court applied the four-factor "right to
control" test, examining (1) direct evidence of the employer's right to or
exercise of control; (2) the employer's furnishing of equipment; (3) the
employer's method of payment; and (4) the employer's right to fire the
plaintiff. 0 2 The court explicitly rejected any "attempt[s] to broadly
characterize the nature of her profession prior to engagement in the
analysis,"103 chastising the court of appeals' "unnecessary" and prejudicial
observation that she was "an itinerant artistic performer."104
The supreme court found that the first factor the employer's right to
control weighed in favor of an employment relationship.0 5 It found that
the Boom Boom Room's procedures upon Lewis's arrival evidenced control,
including its requirements that she pay a tip-out, undergo a search, and





98. Id. at 640, 770 S.E.2d at 395.




103. Id. at 642, 770 S.E.2d at 395.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 641, 770 S.E.2d at 396.
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review the rules sheet. 106 The club's ability to refuse her entry if her
appearance was undesirable also supported its right to control.107 The court
also focused on the club's control during Lewis's shift, finding its control of
the music, the establishment of a stage dance schedule, and the
establishment of minimum V.I.P. dance fees suggested an employment
relationship.'0o While admitting she "had no set schedule, and came when
she chose with no other repercussion than the loss of income," the court
found that "once [the Club] engaged her for the evening, it exercised
significant control over the performance of her work."' 09
In its analysis, the supreme court castigated the court of appeals'
"myopic view" of the club's right to control.110 The court of appeals
narrowly based its determination of the right to control factor on Lewis's
"complete discretion" "while the dance is going on.""' It noted that "[t]he
extent to which an exotic dancer in the Boom Boom Room decides the
manner in which she performs her dance to satisfy the club's
customers . . . is not subject to any limitation or control by the club."" 2
Accordingly, the courts' competing decisions can be attributed to their
degree of focus.
The South Carolina Supreme Court also found that the second factor-
the employer's furnishing of equipment preponderated in favor of an
employment relationship.113 The court noted that "other than her costume,
Lewis brought no other equipment to the Club."114 It refuted the court of
appeals' suggestion that her body was-or even could be her
"equipment."" Because the club provided her "an area for V.I.P. dances, a
stage with a pole, tables, and a sound system," the supreme court found the
second factor weighed in favor of an employment relationship.116
However, the supreme court found that the third factor method of




109. Id at 643, 770 S.E.2d at 396.
110. Id at 642, 770 S.E.2d at 396.
111. Lewis v. L.B. Dynasty, Inc. (Lewis 2012), 400 S.C. 129, 134, 732 S.E.2d 662, 664
(Ct. App. 2012), rev'd, 411 S.C. 637, 770 S.E.2d 393 (2015).
112. Id
113. Lewis 2015, 411 S.C. at 643, 770 S.E.2d at 396.
114. Id at 644, 770 S.E.2d at 397.
115. Id at 643, 770 S.E.2d at 396.
116. Id at 644, 770 S.E.2d at 397.
117. Id at 645, 770 S.E.2d at 397.
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admitted in her brief that the club paid her nothing."8 Rather, "she paid the
club for the right to perform."119 According to both the supreme court and
the court of appeals, this factor clearly preponderated against an employment
relationship. 120
Dissimilarly, the supreme court found that the fourth factor the right to
fire-did weigh in favor of an employment relationship because the club
could both refuse her initial entry and terminate her for violating the rules.121
Though noting that "in any relationship there exists some right to terminate
the arrangement," it distinguished "the absolute right to terminate the
relationship without liability" from those in which a worker had a "legal
right to complete the project."122 Thus, the court examined whether liability
would accrue to the employer "if the work [were] prematurely
interrupted."123 If so, this factor would weigh against an employment
relationship. The court ultimately found that "once she was hired for the
night, the Club could end that relationship prior to her shift ending and leave
Lewis with no recourse for that firing."1 24
The court of appeals, however, reasoned that "[a]ny business has a right
to impose conditions on those to whom it pays money for work, regardless
of whether the worker is an independent contractor or an employee."125
While the supreme court accepted the notion that Lewis could be "hired for
the night,"126 the court of appeals disparagingly noted that "the employment
'relationship' Lewis claims existed was never contemplated to last more
than one night in the club."127 It further noted that "[a]ny business that pays
for work to be performed on its premises is free to terminate the relationship
for the type of conduct" in the rules, "even when the work is being
performed by an independent contractor."128 The courts' differing opinions
seem to turn on (1) the notion that Lewis could be hired "for the night" and
(2) the notion that the rules were specific enough to substantially control
Lewis's conduct. Finding that three out of four factors weighed in favor of
118. Lewis v. L.B. Dynasty, Inc. (Lewis 2012), 400 S.C. 129, 133, 732 S.E.2d 662, 665
(Ct. App. 2012), rev'd, 411 S.C. 637, 770 S.E.2d 393 (2015).
119. Id. at 135, 732 S.E.2d at 665.
120. Lewis 2015, 411 S.C. at 645, 770 S.E.2d at 397; Lewis 2012, 400 S.C. at 136, 732
S.E.2d at 665.
121. Lewis 2015, 411 S.C. at 646, 770 S.E.2d at 398.
122. Id. at 645-46, 770 S.E.2d at 397.
123. Id. at 646, 770 S.E.2d at 397.
124. Id. at 646, 770 S.E.2d at 398.
125. Lewis 2012, 400 S.C. at 136, 732 S.E.2d at 666.
126. Lewis 2015, 411 S.C. at 646, 770 S.E.2d at 398.
127. Lewis 2012, 400 S.C. at 136, 732 S.E.2d at 665.
128. Id. at 136, 732 S.E.2d at 666.
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an employment relationship, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
Lewis was an employee of the Boom Boom Room under the Workers'
Compensation Law.1 29
B. Gardner v. Country Club, Inc., 2015 WL 7783556 (D.S.C. 2015).
In Gardner v. Country Club, Inc., the United States District Court for
the District of South Carolina held as a matter of law that an exotic dancer
was an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act.1 30 The plaintiff in
Gardner, an exotic dancer acting on behalf of herself and other dancers,
alleged a Myrtle Beach, South Carolina "topless adult night club" denied her
minimum wage and overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA.131
On the surface, the relationship between dancer and club in Gardner
seems analogous to that in Lewis. For example, like the "tip-out" fee in
Lewis, Gardner paid a "house fee" for the right to dance upon arrival.132 She
also received a set of written rules after being permitted to dance-at least
the first time she danced at the club.133 She similarly performed various
types of dances once inside, including table dances, couch dances, and
V.I.P.-area dances.134 As in Lewis, the Country Club set a minimum fee for
each.135 It also established a stage dance schedule for each night. 136
Additionally, the club controlled the music to which Gardner danced. 137
Thus, the relationships in Gardner and Lewis appear similar from a large-
scale perspective.
However, Gardner's relationship with the Country Club differs from the
Lewis relationship in key ways. Importantly, Gardner had a fixed schedule
with the club; it required her to work four shifts per week and "at least one
Sunday, Monday, or Tuesday shift each week and at least one 'happy hour
shift' each week."138 Moreover, its rules went far beyond those in Lewis,
including:
129. Lewis 2015, 411 S.C. at 646, 770 S.E.2d at 398.
130. Gardner v. Country Club, Inc., No. 4:13-cv-03399-BHH, 2015 WL 7783556 (D.S.C.
Dec. 3, 2015).
131. Id. at *1.
132. Id. at *3.
133. Id. at *6.
134. Id. at *3.
135. Id.
136. Id. at *6.
137. Id. at *8.
138. Id. at *7.
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a requirement that entertainers check in with the house mom, a
requirement that entertainers who drive utilize valet parking, a
prohibition on significant others in the Club while an entertainer is
working, the requirement that all entertainers take a
breathalyzer ... a prohibition on chewing gum, and the requirement
that all entertainers obtain a "See-Ya Pass" from the house mom
before leaving work.13 9
These rules differ substantially from those administered by the Boom
Boom Room in Lewis. Thus, while from a distant perspective the facts of
Lewis and Gardner seem analogous, closer inspection reveals key
distinctions in their respective employment relationships.
After intensely detailing the facts of Gardner's relationship with the
Country Club,140 the court applied the six-factor "economic reality" test and
found an employment relationship existed.141 In analyzing the first factor-
the employer's degree of control over the manner in which work is
performed the court analyzed the club's dress code requirements, sign-in
requirements, stage schedules, house fees, establishment of minimum dance
fees, tip-sharing requirements, and its "policies intended to maintain a sense
of class."142 Taken together, these specific requirements evidenced the
club's considerable control over Gardner and weighed in favor of an
employment relationship.143
The court found that the second factor-opportunities for profit or
loss-also weighed in favor of an employment relationship.144 Though
noting that dancers might be able to "'hustle' to increase their profits," the
court found that Gardner had "relatively minimal opportunities for profit or
loss." 145
Similarly, the court found that the third factor the capital investments
of the parties-also preponderated for an employment relationship.146 While
operation of the club was a large capital investment on the employer's
behalf, "the plaintiffs investment consist[ed] of house fees and the costs
139. Id. at *6.
140. Id. at *21 ("The Court has written a great deal, but said very little that is new. The
defendant now has a thorough statement of reasons explaining why its case is 'virtually
identical to Degidio, which it has known from the outset, and why the same result is required
in both cases.").
141. Id. at *12.
142. Id. at *13-15.
143. Id. at *15.
144. Id
145. Id
146. Id. at *16.
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associated with her appearance and dress, including a wardrobe of gowns
and shoes for exotic dancing."14 7 Given this wide disparity, the court found
the "investment" factor weighed in favor of an employment relationship.148
The fourth factor-degree of skill required for the work likewise
suggested an employment relationship.149 Though the club maintained that
its hiring practices were "highly selective," the court found that "a majority
of those who appl[ied] [were] hired and that physical appearance [was] the
primary consideration."5 0 The court declined to consider attractiveness "a
'skill.""1' Thus, it found that the fourth factor weighed "in favor of finding
an employer-employee relationship."152
However, the court found that the fifth factor the permanence of the
working relationship weighed in favor of independent contractor status.153
The nature of the adult entertainment business is "transient," and Gardner
only danced at the club "for a matter of months."154 Thus, this sole factor
preponderated against an employment relationship.15 5
Finally, the court found that the sixth factor the degree of integrality to
the employer's business weighed in favor of an employment
relationship.156 Simply put, it found that "exotic dancers are integral to
operations as a gentleman's club." 57
Given the clear preponderance of the factors toward an employment
relationship, the court found that Gardner was an employee of the Country
Club under the FLSA.15 1 Moreover, it castigated the club's emphasis on
"minutia and semantics over substance."159
C. Degidio v. Crazy Horse Saloon and Restaurant, 2015 WL 5834280
(D.S.C. 2015).
In Degidio v. Crazy Horse Saloon and Restaurant, the United States







153. Id. at *16-17.
154. Id. at *16.
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was an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act.1 60 The plaintiff in
Degidio, an exotic dancer acting on behalf of herself and other dancers,
alleged a Myrtle Beach, South Carolina "upscale gentlemen's club" denied
her minimum wage and overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA.161
The facts of Degidio are highly analogous to those of Gardner, and the
court even noted in Gardner that its "analysis was essentially the same in
both cases."162 However, the cases differed in a few substantial aspects. 163
For example, unlike in Gardner, in Degidio the employer had records
indicating its dancers were "independent contractors."164 In Degidio, the
court specifically noted that Crazy Horse Saloon's dancers "often work[ed]
at multiple places or move[d] from one city to another depending on the
season," and they were "not restricted from performing at other adult night
clubs, holding down other jobs, or attending school."165 Additionally, while
the Degidio dancers were "permitted to eat meals, consume alcohol and
smoke cigarettes, and talk on the telephone while in the Club,"166 they were
also required to wear "gowns to the ankle."167 The club in Degidio also
implemented a streamed webcast of dancers on the main stage and in their
dressing room.168
While these select facts distinguished Degidio from Gardner, the court
similarly held that all but one of the factors in the six-factor "economic
reality" test weighed in favor of an employment relationship.169 Just as in
Gardner, only the relative impermanence of the work relationship
preponderated against an employee classification.170
160. Degidio v. Crazy Horse Saloon and Rest., Inc., No. 4:13-CV-02136-BHH, 2015 WL
5834280, at *24 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2015).
161. See id at *1, *4. The plaintiff alleged the actions violated the South Carolina
Payment and Wages Act, which the court found was preempted by FLSA. Id at *4.
162. Gardner, 2015 WL 7783556, at *1.
163. See infra notes 164-168 and accompanying text.
164. Compare Gardner, 2015 WL 7783556, at *11-17 (discussing the relationship
between the defendant and exotic dancers and not mentioning whether the defendant held
records indicating the dancers were independent contractors), with Degidio, 2015 WL
5834280, at *20 (stating that the record indicates the entertainers are classified as independent
contractors).
165. Degidio, 2015 WL 5834280, at *13 (citations omitted).
166. Id. at *8 (citations omitted).
167. Id. (citations omitted).
168. Id. at *10 (citations omitted).
169. Id. at *14.
170. Id. at *13.
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D. McFeeley v. Jackson Street Entertainment, 825 F.3d 235 (4th Cir.
2016).
In McFeeley v. Jackson Street Entertainment, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that an exotic dancer was an employee
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.17' The plaintiff in McFeeley, an exotic
dancer acting on behalf of herself and other dancers, alleged two Maryland
"exotic dance clubs" owned and managed by the same person denied her
minimum wage in violation of the FLSA.1 72
The facts of McFeeley are in many respects similar to Degidio, Gardner,
and Lewis set out above.173 Before dancing at the club, McFeeley "was
required to fill out a form and perform an audition."174 Moreover, upon her
hiring, the club required her to sign an agreement itled "Space/Lease Rental
Agreement of Business Space," which explicitly categorized her as an
independent contractor.'7 1 It also required her to pay a "tip-in" upon her
arrival at the club.176 Like in the previous cases, McFeeley danced both on
stage and in other areas of the club.'7 7 After dancers became familiar to the
clubs, they assigned them a set schedule.17s For example, one dancer
testified to working Tuesdays and Thursdays at one club and Mondays,
Wednesdays, Fridays, and Saturdays at the other.179 The club also enforced
written guidelines prohibiting activities like "drinking while working,
smoking in the club's bathroom, and loitering in the parking lot after
business hours."so Moreover, it set minimum fees for dancers'
performances, managed the club's atmosphere and music, and even
sometimes "coached" dancers.1"'
The Fourth Circuit applied the six-factor "economic reality" test and
ultimately found an employment relationship existed between McFeeley and
the clubs.8 2 The court found that the first factor the employer's control
over work weighed in favor of an employer/employee relationship based
171. McFeeley v. Jackson St. Entm't, LLC, 825 F.3d 235, 244 (4th Cir. 2016).
172. Id. at 239.
173. See supra Sections IILA-C.
174. McFeeley, 825 F.3d at 239.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.; see, e.g., supra Sections IILA-C (detailing the factual background of the
aforementioned cases).
178. McFeeley, 825 F.3d at 242.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. (citations omitted).
182. Id. at 244.
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on the clubs' "'significant control' over how plaintiffs performed their
work."1 83
The court also found that both the second and third factors-the
workers' opportunities for profit or loss and the workers' investments,
respectively preponderated in favor of an employment relationship.184
Though the dancers to some extent "relied on their own skill and ability to
attract clients" by selling tickets for entrance, "distribut[ing] promotional
flyers, and putt[ing] their own photos on the flyers," the court found this did
not evidence their independent opportunity for profit or loss.'8 5 Rather, it
reasoned that "[i]t is natural for an employee to do his part in drumming up
business for his employer, especially if the employee's earnings depend on
it."186 Moreover, the dancers' investments were "limited to their own
apparel and, on occasion, food and decorations they brought to the clubs."8 7
Before addressing the remaining factors, the Fourth Circuit noted their
peripherality to exotic dancer cases generally.1' The court dismissed the
fourth factor, noting that the skill level required of exotic dancers was low.
Moreover, it accorded "little weight" to the fifth, citing the "inherently
itinerant" nature of the dancers' work. 189 In addressing the sixth factor, the
court simply noted that an "exotic dance club could [not] function, much less
be profitable, without exotic dancers."190 Thus, the court found that all
factors either weighed in favor of an employment relationship or were
ambiguous. It accordingly deemed McFeeley and other dancers employees
of the clubs.191
In summary, exotic dancers have been deemed clubs' employees in
every case determined by South Carolina courts and the Fourth Circuit thus
far. Though both the factual scenarios and the legal tests differ slightly
between Lewis, Gardner, Degidio, and McFeeley, the courts' focuses are
largely the same. For example, all four cases examine the employment
relationship through a similarly distanced perspective; they do not narrow
their focus to the dancing itself, nor do they expand their focus to the
183. Id. at 242.
184. Id. at 243 (quoting Schultz v. Capital Int'l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 305 (4th Cir.
2006)).
185. McFeely, 825 F.3d at 243.
186. Id
187. Id. (citations omitted).
188. Id. at 244.
189. Id
190. Id (quoting Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-
Appellees, McFeeley v. Jackson St. Entm't, LLC, 825 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1583),
2015 WL 9315891, at *24).
191. Id at 244.
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dancers' lives outside the clubs. Rather, they focus on the dancers' and the
employers' activities throughout the night from entry in to exit from the
building.
Additionally, the courts unanimously viewed exotic dancing as requiring
a small degree of skill and little capital investment. Moreover, the courts did
not envision better dancing equating to higher earnings; they unanimously
found that dancers lacked any ability to increase earnings aside from
working additional hours.
Drawing from these decisions, we may now explore South Carolina's
likely determinations of platform economy employment cases.
IV. PREPARING SOUTH CAROLINA FOR PLATFORM ECONOMY EMPLOYMENT
South Carolina courts have not yet had the opportunity to analyze a
platform economy employment case. However, as highlighted above, they
have addressed factually analogous issues from a surprising source: exotic
dancers. Thus, to determine South Carolina's readiness for platform
economy employment disputes, we have examined those analogous
opinions. Based on the examination above, we can now approximate a South
Carolina court's ruling on a platform employment case if it arose within our
current jurisprudence. This Part first offers such an approximation applied to
a hypothetical case with the same facts as the seminal O'Connor v. Uber.192
It then compares South Carolina's probable jurisprudence with the Means-
Seiner model of platform economy employment.
A. Approximating South Carolina's Platform Employment
Jurisprudence
If a South Carolina court was faced with facts similar to O'Connor v.
Uber, it probably would deem the Uber driver an employee. Indeed, whether
the driver worked full time and exclusively as an Uber driver or simply
supplemented his income from another job with driving, a South Carolina
court's analysis would probably find him an employee. For example, if the
driver brought a state court claim under the Workers' Compensation Law,
the court would likely apply a similar analysis as that found in Lewis.193 The
court would probably apply the same four-factor right to control test. As in
Lewis, the court would likely apply an intermediate perspective to the
employment relationship under this test; it would not narrow its focus to
192. See O'Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
193. See supra Section III.A.
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Uber's control over the driver's driving, but it would not extend its focus to
the driver's life outside his time on the app. In doing so, it would likely take
Uber's Handbook's expectations that "[w]e expect on-duty drivers to accept
all [ride] requests" or its suggestions that drivers "make sure the radio is off
or on soft jazz or NPR" as evidence of control.194 The fact that the driver
could start and stop work unilaterally at his leisure would probably not
weigh against an employment relationship under this factor, as in Lewis the
dancer frequently came to the club "uninvited and unannounced."195
However, the court's likely handling of the "equipment" prong of the
four-factor workers' compensation test is less clearly anticipated. The court
might find that provision of a car is more meaningful than the provision of a
dancer's costume or her body itself. However, because cars are widely
owned and commonly used for activities outside Uber driving, the court
might find that Uber drivers still seem "far more closely akin to wage
earners toiling for a living, than to independent entrepreneurs seeking a
return on their risky capital investments."196 Moreover, Uber frequently
helps its drivers secure cars by assisting with discounts or providing access
to a licensed car in users' areas. 197 Thus, depending on the specific facts
fixated upon, a South Carolina court may very well find that even the
equipment factor preponderated for an employment relationship.
Moreover, the court's likely handling of the payment factor would
probably also suggest an employment relationship. Like the dancer in Lewis,
an Uber driver lacks control over his wages. Indeed, Uber's algorithm sets
prices in real-time. Additionally, unlike Lewis, Uber drivers receive wages
via direct deposit at regular intervals with predictable pay periods.'98 Thus, a
South Carolina court would likely determine that even the method of
payment factor suggested an employment relationship.
Finally, a South Carolina court's analysis of Uber's right to fire would
probably suggest its employer status. As the club in Lewis, Uber sets rules
and guidelines-violations of which can prompt deactivation of a user's
194. O'Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149.
195. See Lewis v. L.B. Dynasty, Inc. (Lewis 2012), 400 S.C. 129, 132, 732 S.E.2d 662,
663 (Ct. App. 2012), rev'd, 411 S.C. 637, 770 S.E.2d 393 (2015).
196. Lewis v. L.B. Dynasty, Inc. (Lewis 2015), 411 S.C. 637, 644, 770 S.E.2d 393, 397
(2015) (quoting Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen's Club, 336 P.2d 951, 959 (Nev. 2014)).
197. Vehicle Solutions, UBER, https://www.uber.com/en-SE/drive/vehicle-solutions/ (last
visited Feb. 23, 2018).
198. See Getting Paid, UBER, https://www.uber.com/en-SG/drive/singapore/resources/
getting-paid/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2018).
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account.199 Thus, despite likely acknowledging the driver's "right not to
[drive] at all," the court would probably find that Uber could end its
relationship with a driver and leave the driver with "no recourse for that
firing." 200 It would likely view Uber's ability to deactivate drivers as
analogous to the club's ability to end dancers' employment unilaterally. 201 It
would thus probably find that the fourth factor suggested an employment
relationship.
Accordingly, under the four-factor "right to control" test, a South
Carolina court would probably deem a part-time Uber driver an employee of
the company. Even if-like the dancer in Lewis-the Uber driver worked
only a few times per month for the company at his whim, a South Carolina
court might still find an employment relationship.
Similarly, if a South Carolina district court scrutinized a case with facts
similar to O'Connor v. Uber under the FLSA's six-factor employment test
and Fourth Circuit precedent, it would likely deem the Uber driver an
employee. As indicated above, under the FLSA's six-factor test courts
analyze (1) the putative employer's degree of control over the manner in
which the work is performed; (2) the worker's opportunities for profit or loss
dependent on managerial skill; (3) the worker's investment in equipment,
material, or other workers; (4) the degree of skill required for the work; (5)
the permanence of the working relationship; and (6) the integrality of the
worker's services to the putative employer's business.202 By applying the
analyses undertaken in Gardner, Degidio, and McFeeley, a district court in
South Carolina would likely deem Uber drivers employees.
As in Gardner, Degidio, and McFeeley, the court would likely find that
the first factor-control over the manner in which work is performed
weighed in favor of an employment relationship. In the exotic dancer cases,
the courts relied heavily on the clubs' sign-in requirements, stage schedules,
establishment of minimum dance fees, and their "policies intended to
maintain a sense of class" in making their employment determinations.203
These facts are closely paralleled by Uber drivers' requirement to login to
the Uber app, Uber's establishment of minimum fees as well as control over
199. See Driver Deactivation Policy, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/ada3b961-e3c2-
48e6-ac3f-2db5936e37a9 (last visited Feb. 23, 2018) ("A rider or driver who breaks the Uber
code of conduct may be barred from using Uber on a temporary or permanent basis.").
200. Lewis 2015, 411 S.C. at 646, 770 S.E.2d at 398.
201. Id.
202. Schultz v. Capital Int'l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 304-05 (4th Cir. 2006).
203. See, e.g., Gardner v. Country Club, Inc., No. 4:13-CV-03399-BHH, 2015 WL
7783556, at *14-15 (D.S.C. Dec. 3, 2015) (examining such policies as indicia of control).
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fluctuations in fees, and its "suggestions" concerning car atmosphere.204
Accordingly, a South Carolina district court would likely find that the first
factor preponderated in favor of an employment relationship.
The court would likely find the same for the second factor the
worker's opportunities for profit or loss dependent on managerial skill. In
the exotic dancer cases, the courts discounted the notion that the dancers'
ability to "hustle," i.e., work more hours, constituted managerially-based
opportunities for profit or loss. 205 Because the clubs awarded the dancers no
additional funds for dancing "better," they had "relatively minimal
opportunities for profit or loss."206 Uber drivers analogously are not directly
rewarded for "better" driving and can only increase their profits by driving
additional hours. Thus, a South Carolina court would likely find that the
second factor also preponderated in favor of an employment relationship.
A court's determination regarding the third factor the worker's
investment in equipment, material, or other workers-is less clear. In the
exotic dancer cases, the dancers' "investments" were limited to house fees
and "their own apparel, and, on occasion, food and decorations they brought
to the club."207 However, Uber drivers all have an obvious and substantial
investment: a car. They probably also have insurance and similar
investments.208 While a car might today be considered too commonplace to
constitute a separate "investment" for employment purposes, it is the central
machinery of Uber's business model. Moreover, the court would probably
compare the individual driver's investment with Uber's large capital
investment in the business.209 Given these relatively even arguments, the
court would likely find it ambiguous as to whether this factor preponderated
in favor of an employment relationship.
However, the court would probably find no ambiguity for the fourth
factor the degree of skill required for the work. Though the courts
analyzing exotic dancers' worker status admitted that stripping required
some base-line level of dancing skills and attractiveness, they unanimously
found it unskilled labor.21 0 Likewise, the court would probably find that the
204. See Community Guidelines, UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/community-guide
lines/us-en/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2018); see also Drive, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/
(last visited Feb. 23, 2018).
205. See Gardner, 2015 WL 7783556, at *15 (citing McFeeley v. Jackson St. Entm't,
LLC, 825 F.3d 235, 270 (4th Cir. 2016)).
206. Id.
207. McFeeley, 825 F.3d at 243.
208. Hall & Krueger, supra note 16, at 16-17.
209. Cf Gardner, 2015 WL 7783556, at *15-16 (comparing the investments of the clubs
versus the dancers).
210. Id. at *16; see also McFeeley, 825 F.3d at 243-44.
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degree of skill required for basic driving competency does not suggest Uber
drivers' independence. Thus, it would likely find that the fourth factor
weighed in favor of an employment relationship.
Under South Carolina's interpretation of the six-factor FLSA test, the
fifth factor the permanence of the working relationship may or may not
suggest an employment relationship. This factor appears to be the most
variable among the lot, as it turns on the individual worker's circumstances.
The courts in the exotic dancer cases found that the duration of the dancers'
employment only "for a matter of months" weighed against an employment
relationship.211 While certain Uber drivers may remain so for years, a large
number do not last more than a year.212 Though this factor would depend
upon the individual driver's circumstances, it would more frequently than
not weigh against an employment relationship.
The final factor the integrality of the worker's services to the putative
employer's business would probably further suggest an employment
relationship. In the exotic dancer cases, the courts simply found that "exotic
dancers are integral to operations as a gentleman's club."2 13 Analogously,
Uber drivers are integral to Uber's operations as a technology company or as
a transportation company. Thus, no matter Uber's metaphysical
classification, the court would likely find that the sixth factor suggested an
employment relationship.
Taken together, four out of the six factors would almost certainly
suggest an employment relationship to a South Carolina court. The fifth
factor permanence would depend upon the worker's individual
circumstances. Only the third factor-investment could conceivably weigh
against an employment relationship generally. But because at least four of
the six would suggest employment in every case, the court would deem
virtually all Uber drivers in South Carolina employees of the company.
Thus, whether in state or federal court, South Carolina jurisprudence would
likely deem Uber drivers employees under both of the most commonly
applied employment tests. Importantly, due to the inadequate analysis of
South Carolina's current jurisprudence, the courts' decisions would probably
not change depending upon the individual Uber driver's work
circumstances.
211. See Gardner, 2015 WL 7783556, at *16.
212. Hall & Krueger, supra note 16, at 16.
213. Gardner, 2015 WL 7783556, at *17.
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B. South Carolina and Academic Models
As we have seen, a South Carolina court determining facts similar to
O'Connor v. Uber would likely deem Uber drivers employees under both
the six-factor FLSA test and the four-factor right to control test. This
determination would probably not change based on the individual Uber
driver's circumstances. Thus, South Carolina's current jurisprudence would
likely apply a one-size-fits-all approach to Uber employment and likely to
other platform employment as well.
This unrefined approach contradicts the most promising scholarly
models of platform economy employment.214 As noted above, recently
proposed employment models of the platform economy differ widely in both
aim and feasibility.215 Generally speaking, three categories of approaches
have emerged: (1) "modification" approaches; (2) "third category"
approaches; and (3) "assumption-shifting" approaches.2 16 However, South
Carolina's conservative approach to jurisprudential reforms leaves any
discussion of the second and third categories unproductive.217 In all
likelihood, South Carolina will not create whole cloth a third category of
worker. Additionally, it will probably not create a default assumption of
employee in all cases.
Rather, as detailed above, the most promising model for South Carolina
articulated thus far is the Means-Seiner "worker flexibility" approach.218
This approach is not only elegantly simple, but it allows for different
determinations for different workers. Importantly, it emphatically avoids a
one-size-fits-all approach. Thus, South Carolina's likely ruling in an Uber
case is at odds with the most prudent scholarship on the topic.
Fortunately, however, South Carolina is in a unique position: it can
anticipatorily correct its jurisprudence before issuing improper precedent.
No South Carolina court has yet ruled on an Uber-or any platform
economy employment case. What's more, the Means-Seiner approach
requires neither legislative intervention nor dramatic judicial action. In fact,
the worker flexibility approach is already embedded in an examination of the
"economic reality" of a working relationship. Thus, a South Carolina court is
probably already obligated to consider worker flexibility because it "clarifies
214. See supra Section II.B.
215. See supra Section II.B.
216. See supra Section II.B.
217. See supra Section II.B.
218. See Means & Seiner, supra note 28 (for a more detailed explanation of the "worker-
flexibility" approach).
974 [VOL. 69: 945
30
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss4/7
EMPLOYMENT LAW
the economic independence of working relationships."21 9 Thus, a South
Carolina court could easily apply it in its first foray into platform
employment. In doing so, South Carolina could bypass years of unhelpful
and overgeneralizing decisions, all while maintaining its business-friendly
image.220
V. CONCLUSION
South Carolina courts' previous employment determinations of exotic
dancers shed helpful light on their likely responses to Uber and other
platform economy employment disputes. Based on these decisions, a South
Carolina court would likely indiscriminately deem Uber drivers and many
other platform economy workers employees. Such a determination would be
antithetical to South Carolina's coveted "business-friendly" environment and
would contradict the most promising scholarly approaches to platform
employment. Because no South Carolina court has yet faced a platform
employment dispute, however, South Carolina is in a unique position to
anticipatorily adopt the leading scholarly approaches to platform
employment before establishing unhelpful precedent. Accordingly, South
Carolina courts should do so when first handling an Uber or other platform
employment issue by proceeding under the Means-Seiner "worker
flexibility" approach. Unlike most other approaches, the Means-Seiner
approach requires neither legislative intervention nor dramatic judicial
activity. Therefore, South Carolina courts should recognize the inadequacies
of their current employment jurisprudence to the platform economy, and
they should anticipatorily adopt the Means-Seiner approach to such issues.
Axton D. Crolley
219. Id. at 1536.
220. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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